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Abstract
Research on partisan motivated reasoning shows that citizens perceive the world differently based upon
their partisan allegiances. Here we marshal evidence from several national surveys to investigate whether
partisan motivated reasoning is attenuated among partisans situated within disagreeable political
discussion networks. While our analyses suggest that exposure to interpersonal disagreement is associated
with weaker partisan identities, we find limited evidence that disagreement attenuates partisan differences
in knowledge or retrospective evaluations of the economy. This suggests that interpersonal disagreement
is unlikely to help reduce partisan motivated reasoning. Our results thus speak to important debates
concerning the influence of social discussion on political attitudes, the nature of partisan motivated
reasoning and the ability of citizens to hold elites accountable.
Keywords motivated reasoning; economic evaluations; political knowledge; political discussion
Representative democracies require citizens to be capable of holding elites to account via the
rewarding of good performance and the punishing of bad. It is against the backdrop of this
normative claim that recent work on partisan motivated reasoning becomes worrying. Partisans
generally try to expose themselves predominantly to partisan friendly messages and vigorously
dispute information harmful to their favored party (Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus 2013;
Iyengar and Hahn 2009; Stroud 2011). These processes of selective attention and interpretation
may result in citizens being unable to accurately perceive elite performance thereby threatening
accountability efforts (Druckman 2014; Jerit and Barabas 2012; Lebo and Cassino 2007; Ramirez
and Erickson 2014). These studies raise an important question: what types of contexts constrain
partisan motivated reasoning?
Recent reviews have suggested one potential context that may attenuate partisan motivated
reasoning: disagreeable political discussion networks (Bolsen, Druckman, and Cook 2014, 253;
Leeper and Slothuus 2014, 144). The motivation to affirm and defend one’s partisan identity is
not an unbounded impulse, but one that can be mitigated by the presence of continual streams of
party-challenging information (Lavine, Johnston, and Steenbergen 2012; Redlawsk, Civettini, and
Emmerson 2010). While partisans may work to construct news diets so as to minimize their
mediated exposure to this type of information, political discussion with friends, family and co-
workers may operate as an alternative, and fairly pervasive, source of partisan challenge. Indi-
viduals may encounter reasons to question their partisan allegiances via such discussions which,
in turn, may prompt them to hold weaker partisan identities and thereby experience a dimin-
ished motivation to selectively process political information (Klofstad, Sokhey, and McClurg
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2013; Sinclair 2012). The possibility that social disagreement may attenuate partisan biases is
politically and theoretically important, but one that has not received much prior attention.1 Our
central question is thus: does exposure to political disagreement within one’s political discussion
network attenuate partisan motivated reasoning?
We contribute to the literatures on partisan motivated reasoning and interpersonal discussion
by exploring their interrelationship with regards to a politically important manifestation of partisan
motivated reasoning: citizens’ propensity to evaluate the national economy based on the parti-
sanship of the incumbent government (Bartels 2008; Duch, Palmer, and Anderson 2000; Enns and
McAvoy 2012; Evans and Andersen 2006; Evans and Pickup 2010). Existing work shows that
supporters of the incumbent party will discount negative, and opponents positive, information
about economic performance. Partisan disagreements over economic performance raise troubling
questions regarding the ability of the mass public to discharge its role in holding elites accountable
given the important role such evaluations play as a consideration guiding vote choices (Duch and
Stevenson 2008; Fiorina 1981).2 We will thus explore whether social disagreement disrupts these
patterns. In particular, we will investigate whether the level of disagreement within a partisan’s
political discussion network is associated with an increased propensity to make partisan-
incongruent evaluations of the economy when called for, e.g. for out-partisans to render more
positive evaluations of economic conditions during good economic times.
We marshal the best available observational evidence concerning the relationship between
interpersonal disagreement and partisan motivated reasoning on economic matters. Specifically,
we use evidence from five national surveys from the United States to explore how partisan
differences in factual knowledge and subjective retrospective assessments of the economy vary
according to the extent of disagreement in partisans’ discussion networks. Our results provide
meager support for the claim that interpersonal disagreement attenuates partisan bias in this
domain. On the one hand, exposure to disagreement is associated with an increased propensity
to correctly answer factual questions about the economy when such facts are incongruent with
the respondent’s partisan identity, but the evidence is somewhat mixed across the surveys. On the
other hand, we find that network disagreement does little to consistently affect partisans’ sub-
jective evaluations of the economy in a way consistent with an attenuation of partisan reasoning
strategies. Our results thus suggest that interpersonal disagreement is not a panacea for partisan
motivated reasoning.
Partisanship, Motivated Cognition and Economic Assessments
The past several decades have witnessed a resurgence of work on the motivated bases of human
cognition and has resulted in an understanding that human reasoning and information pro-
cessing is goal-directed (Kunda 1990). In the political realm particular attention has been paid to
directional goals (Leeper and Slothuus 2014; Lodge and Taber 2006; Nir 2011b). When direc-
tional goals are salient, which appears to be generally, individuals select and process information
so as to favor a particular outcome, i.e. to affirm one’s status in, and defend the validity of, one’s
partisan identity. Directional reasoning may manifest in selective exposure where individuals
seek out attitudinally congruent information (Druckman, Fein, and Leeper 2012; Lodge and
Taber 2006; Stroud 2011). Meanwhile, when discordant information is encountered directional
goals stimulate active cognitive efforts to rationalize and reject this information (Lodge and
Taber 2006; Lord, Ross, and Lepper 1979; Mullinix 2016). This work largely supports the
1One notable exception is Klar (2014), which we discuss in greater detail below.
2Of course, even if partisans agree that the economy is doing well or poorly they may still disagree about who or what is
responsible, with partisanship guiding this attributional process, as in Bisgaard (2015) and Tilley and Hobolt (2011).
However, this type of disagreement strikes us as less normatively problematic. Agreement on factual matters is a precursor to
collective deliberation and thus intrinsically valuable.
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argument that partisans often see the world through a partisan perceptual screen (Bolsen,
Druckman, and Cook 2014; Campbell et al. 1960).
The operation of partisan guided reasoning processes can help explain partisan disagreements
concerning economic performance. First, partisans may pay attention to different news sources
which report economic news in a divergent manner (Larcinese, Puglisi, and Snyder 2011; Stroud
2011). In addition, partisans may also selectively perceive information about economic perfor-
mance when it is received (Bartels 2008; Enns, Kellstedt, and McAvoy 2012; Lebo and Cassino
2007; Ramirez and Erickson 2014). Finally, partisans may be motivated to selectively report their
perceptions so as to maintain the positive value of their identity (Bullock et al. 2015; Prior, Sood,
and Khanna 2015).3 While partisan disagreements over the economy are not entirely the fault of
these partisan biases, economic perceptions appear to be strongly guided by their relevance for
the validity of one’s partisan identity.4 This recurrent finding raises a politically and normatively
important question: what types of political and social contexts constrain partisan motivated
reasoning?
Social Networks, Disagreement and The Potential Reduction of Partisan Bias
Individuals do not form political opinions in a vacuum. Rather, political attitudes are greatly
influenced by interactions with other citizens and particularly the friends, family and acquain-
tances that comprise their political discussion networks (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Mutz
2006; Sinclair 2012). Particularly relevant for our purposes are studies demonstrating that the
extent of political disagreement within these networks is consequential. In particular, prior work
connects exposure to interpersonal disagreement with weaker (e.g. less extreme and more
ambivalent) issue and candidate preferences, greater openness to persuasion, enhanced knowl-
edge of the legitimate rationales for opposing viewpoints, and with a greater openness to voting
for candidates from different political parties (Bloom and Levitan 2011; Huckfeldt, Mendez, and
Osborn 2004; Lupton, Singh, and Thornton 2015; Mutz 2002a; Mutz 2002b; Pattie and Johnston
2008; Robison, Leeper, and Druckman 2018; Sinclair 2012; Visser and Mirabile 2004). Indivi-
duals situated within discussion networks with high levels of disagreement appear to be more
‘deliberative’ in their political attitude formation processes.5
While the foregoing studies are not explicitly focused on partisan motivated reasoning, they
nevertheless provide a reasonable basis for suggesting that interpersonal disagreement will also
help attenuate partisan reasoning biases.6 However, we are aware of only one study that explicitly
explores this possibility, Klar’s (2014) experimental study showing that respondents assigned to a
mixed discussion setting demonstrated less evidence of partisan bias in reactions to persuasive
messages than those assigned to a discussion context consisting only of co-partisans. While
important evidence, argumentative discussions in this study occurred in an evenly divided setting
(i.e. four Democrats and four Republicans) among individuals who did not know each other, and
3Notably, Prior, Sood, and Khanna show this by invoking a social accountability motive on the part of respondents, i.e. a
similar type of stimulus as explored here.
4There exist additional explanations for partisan disagreements in retrospective economic assessments. For instance,
partisan groups may place differential weights on unemployment and inflation, thereby yielding different perceptions of the
economy; see Gerber and Green (1999). However, studies of aggregate responses to economic information suggest that
unemployment matters more than inflation for all partisan groups: see Enns, Kellstedt, and McAvoy (2012) and Enns and
McAvoy (2012).
5While our focus lies on the discussions citizens have informally with their peers, research on small group decision making
and democratic deliberation also highlight the importance of disagreement in opinion formation processes (e.g. Barabas
2004; Mendelberg 2002; Wojcieszak 2012). Perhaps particularly notable is the literature on group polarization wherein small
group discussion on a decision tends to polarize initial opinions among those discussing the issue among the like-minded
and de-polarize opinions among those discussing the issue in a more heterogeneous, or argumentative, setting (Isenberg
1986).
6As is done by Bolsen, Druckman, and Cook (2014), Druckman (2014), and Leeper and Slothuus (2014).
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thus had little expectation of future interactions, which may prevent easy generalization to more
common networks wherein peers know each other, broadly expect to interact again in the future
and where disagreement is more or less one-sided (Nir 2005, 2011a). Moreover, Klar could only
look at the responses of Democratic students, leaving open the possibility that effects will vary
across partisan groups or among older individuals. Ultimately, a test of the argument that
exposure to interpersonal disagreement within discussion networks undermines directional
motivated reasoning requires replication with evidence from more naturalistic discussion
networks.
Why might an individual’s susceptibility to partisan motivated reasoning vary alongside the
level of political disagreement within their political discussion network? Information processing
is not only guided by directional goals such as the desire to affirm one’s partisan identity, but is
instead a balancing act between directional, accuracy and efficiency goals (Chaiken, Giner-
Sorolla, and Chen 1996; Lavine, Johnston, and Steenbergen 2012). The priority given to a
directional goal will depend upon the relative strength of this goal. In the current context the
directional goal is the motive to defend one’s partisan identity, which is rooted in the strength
and relevance of the partisan identity for the individual. As partisan identity strength increases,
in other words, so too will an individual’s propensity to act in such a way as to affirm the validity
of their partisan allegiance (Huddy, Mason, and Aarøe 2015; Mullinix 2016).
Partisan motivated reasoning increases alongside identity strength. Crucially, higher levels of
social disagreement are likely to be associated with weaker partisan identities much as they are
with issue attitudes more generally (for instance: Klofstad, Sokhey, and McClurg 2013; Lavine,
Johnston, and Steenbergen 2012; Sinclair 2012). The extent of disagreement within a network will
influence the type of information an individual receives regarding political affairs. Agreeing
partners, i.e. partners with the same partisan identity, provide identity-congruent information
that can be used to further bolster the validity of one’s partisan allegiance. Disagreeing partners,
i.e. those with dissimilar partisan preferences, may instead provide identity-challenging infor-
mation. For instance, discussions with disagreeing others provide insight into the legitimate
rationales for the other side’s positions which may lead to more positive views of the other side
and hence identity ambivalence (Lavine, Johnston, and Steenbergen 2012; Mutz 2002a; Mutz and
Mondak 2006; Pattie and Johnston 2008; Price, Cappella, and Nir 2002). In addition, partisans
tend to believe the other side to be homogeneous in nature, which facilitates perceptions of party
polarization and hence an increased likelihood that an individual will self-categorize as a partisan
and work to defend their partisan identity (Ahler and Sood 2018; Druckman, Peterson, and
Slothuus 2013). However, discussing politics with individuals from the other side can disrupt
these stereotypes and mitigate perceptions of polarization, which should thus disrupt partisan
self-categorization processes and hence reduce the relevance of the partisan identity to the
individual (Buttice, Huckfeldt, and Ryan 2009; Lyons and Sokhey 2017). Finally, disagreeing
others can be a conduit to information contained in media sources a partisan would otherwise
ignore, thereby providing a route for party-critical information to reach them (Druckman,
Levendusky, and McLain 2018). Given that interpersonal discussion networks tend to be tilted
toward close ties, i.e. friends and family, this incongruent information is potentially more
credible, and hence effective, than if it had been encountered from elite out-partisan sources
(Huckfeldt 2001; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Lupia 2002; Mutz 2006; Sinclair 2012). And, while
exposure to disagreement may inspire efforts to counter-argue, continual exposure to incon-
gruent information, as we might expect to occur in ongoing social relationships, can break down
this tendency (Lodge and Taber 2006; Redlawsk, Civettini, and Emmerson 2010). Partisans
within disagreeable networks may thus possess both the information necessary to come to more
accurate understandings of the economy as well as a diminished motivation to resist this
information due to weakened (i.e. less extreme or more ambivalent) identities.
If partisan motivated reasoning is rooted in the strength of an individual’s partisan identity,
and higher levels of disagreement undermine identity strength, then it is plausible that partisans
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within more argumentative networks will evince lesser evidence of partisan motivated reasoning.
What would this look like? We focus on whether disagreement is associated with an increased
likelihood that partisans express party-incongruent beliefs regarding the national economy as it is
in this arena that motivated reasoning related biases should be most apparent. Our specific focus
is on partisans’ knowledge of facts regarding economic performance and their retrospective
economic evaluations. If disagreement undermines partisan motivated reasoning, then it should
help promote the expression of these incongruent beliefs when called for.
HYPOTHESIS 1: Increasing levels of political disagreement will be associated with an increased
likelihood of expressing partisan-incongruent beliefs about the national
economy, all else equal.
To illustrate this hypothesis let us first consider individuals that identify with the same party
as the incumbent government, what we will call in-partisans. These individuals will generally be
motivated to process information to the advantage of their co-partisans in government. During
positive economic conditions this is not too difficult as incoming economic information aligns
with that motivation. However, when economic conditions sour there should exist friction
between this party defensive motivation and incoming information that will depress the like-
lihood that in-partisans will correctly answer economy-related knowledge questions and report
negative evaluations of the national economy. However, if the level of disagreement within a
partisan’s political discussion network attenuates partisan motivated reasoning, then we would
expect to see an increased likelihood of correctly answering economy-related factual questions
and reporting negative evaluations of the economy among this partisan group even though such
beliefs clash with one’s goal of defending one’s partisan team. Our expectations regarding out-
partisans are the inverse. We are interested in out-partisan reactions during positive economic
conditions as this is when there should exist friction between partisan defensive motivations and
one’s incoming information. Our hypothesis holds that disagreement will be associated with
increased knowledge and increasingly positive evaluations for this group in such contexts.
Methods
We draw on five national surveys conducted in the United States to investigate our hypotheses.
Specifically, we use data from the US version of the 1992 Cross-National Election Project
(CNEP), the 2000 ANES Time Series (TS), the panel component of the 2002 ANES Time Series
wherein respondents from the 2000 ANES TS were reinterviewed (hereafter 2002 ANES Panel),
the 2006 ANES Pilot and several waves from the 2008–9 ANES Panel survey. There are several
advantages to using this array of data sources. First, the surveys were conducted in varying
economic conditions, which enables us to test our specific in- and out-partisan expectations.7
Table A1 in the online appendix provides economic statistics for each survey. Broadly speaking,
the surveys conducted in 1992, 2002 and 2008–9 were fielded during negative economic con-
ditions, while those fielded in 2000 and 2006 took place in more positive economic conditions.
A second advantage of using this array of surveys is that it enables us to look at contexts where a
Democrat or a Republican was President and thus enables variation in which partisan team is
considered ‘in-partisans’ and which are considered ‘out-partisans’. Finally, the 2002 ANES Panel
and 2008–9 ANES Panel surveys enable us to obtain some distance between the measurement of
our independent variables (partisanship and network disagreement) and our dependent vari-
ables, as in both cases the former were measured anywhere from one month to two years prior in
time to the latter.
7In addition, prior work suggests that individuals are more sensitive to negative than positive economic conditions and
information and thus variation in economic conditions can enable us to avoid making inferences based on only a single
economic context; see, for instance, Soroka (2006) and Stanig (2013).
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Core independent variables: partisanship and network disagreement
We will detail our dependent variables in the sections to come. However, let us first note the nature
of our two main independent variables. Partisanship is a binary indicator coded so that partisans
that identify with the same party as the incumbent President (in-partisans) are given a score of 1 and
partisans identifying with the opposite party receive a score of 0 (out-partisans). Thus, we code
Republican respondents as in-partisans in 1992, 2002 and 2006, when a President Bush occupied the
White House while Democrats in these survey years are coded as out-partisans. Meanwhile, we code
Republican respondents as out-partisans and Democrats as in-partisans in 2000 and the two 2009
panel waves due to the presence of a Democratic President at the time of the survey. Leaning
partisans are included in this binary measure while pure Independents are excluded from the
analysis, given the focus on difference in response between partisan groups.
Respondents to each survey completed a battery of items concerning their political discussion
network. These batteries always began with a name-generator question wherein respondents
were asked whether they discussed politics/important matters with anyone or not. Notably,
asking individuals about peers with whom they discuss ‘important matters’ versus politics does
not appear to elicit different types of responses (Klofstad, McClurg, and Rolfe 2009). On the
ANES surveys, the network generators were included on the post-election wave of the 2000
ANES, the 2006 Pilot which occurred after the 2006 mid-term election, and the September 2008
wave of the 2008–9 ANES Panel which began in January 2008. Note that we are focusing here on
those individuals that completed the battery, i.e. those that said they discuss politics or important
matters with at least one person, as is customary (Mutz 2002b; Sinclair 2012; Sokhey and
McClurg 2012).
Individuals that said yes to this initial question were then asked detailed questions concerning
up to five (1992 CNEP), four (ANES 2000 TS/ANES 2002 Panel) or three (ANES 2006, ANES
2008–9) discussants. The types of individuals typically captured by these name generators tend to
be relatively strong ties (i.e. close friends, spouses and family members), but co-workers, i.e.
generally weaker ties, also represent a significant percentage of discussants as well (see Klofstad,
McClurg, and Rolfe 2009, table 2). While these questions, and our resultant measures, focus on
respondents’ perceptions of their discussants, prior research suggests that individuals are often
quite accurate in these perceptions and that it is the perception, not the reality, that influences
individuals (Huckfeldt, Mendez, and Osborn 2004, 69; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995, 154–5; Mutz
2002b).
On each survey respondents were asked about the political views of their named discussants.
Respondents were asked about the Presidential candidate preference of each discussant in the
1992 CNEP and 2000 ANES TS/2002 ANES Panel surveys, while in the remainder of the surveys
they were asked about discussant partisanship. Our measure of Network Disagreement was
calculated by subtracting the number of discussants with the same PID or candidate preference,
i.e. agreeing discussants (A), from the number of discussants with different preferences (D;
Network Disagreement=D – A; Lupton, Singh, and Thornton 2015; Lupton and Thornton
2017).8 The resulting variable ranges from −5 to +5 on the 1992 CNEP, −4 to +4 on the 2000 and
2002 ANES, and −3 to +3 on the 2006 and 2008–9 ANES surveys, with higher scores indicating
greater potential exposure to disagreement.9 Respondents scoring below 0 are situated within
networks with more agreeable than disagreeable partners, while those above 0 experience an
8Discussants for whom the respondent reported not knowing a political preference necessarily do not contribute to the
disagreement measure as we do not have the information necessary to categorize these dyads. We discuss the nature of these
‘missing’ discussants in online Appendix C. Disagreeing dyads in this coding scheme count non-major party partners as
disagreeing (i.e. a Democrat/Independent pairing). We investigate the consequences of this coding choice in online Appendix
C and find that focusing only on major party dyads yields the same pattern of results reported below.
9In online Appendix D we explore alternative specifications of exposure to disagreement, including measures that
incorporate information about the size of the network, frequency of political discussion, the perceived political sophistication
of the discussants, the perceived closeness of discussants and how much the respondent ‘generally’ disagrees about political
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overall tilt toward disagreement in the network. While the mean value on this variable is below 0
for all surveys, most respondents nevertheless possess at least one disagreeable partner.10
Control variables and dealing with potential selection issues
Our data on social network composition are observational in nature, which necessarily limits our
ability to speak to the causality of the relationships shown below. One potential worry is that
individuals could plausibly select into networks based on the level of political disagreement.
While we cannot remove such concerns we address them in two ways. First, Sinclair notes that
social networks typically do not form based on shared political beliefs but instead on other social
characteristics (Sinclair 2012). She thus recommends controlling ‘for the social characteristics
that generate homophily’ as one means of reducing endogeneity concerns (Sinclair 2012, 16). All
analyses reported here control for age, gender, education, race, family income, marital status and
political interest/news attention for just this reason.11 In addition, the ANES analyses contain
measures for the respondent’s need for cognition and need to evaluate, which are included as
controls because these cognitive style indicators have previously been connected with an indi-
vidual’s general propensity to engage in directional motivated reasoning.12 Second, we leverage
the panel nature of the ANES surveys in analyses reported in online Appendix E by replicating
our analyses using a measure of disagreement that has been preprocessed using a matching
algorithm. Specifically, in each case we can use measures obtained in waves conducted prior to
when network disagreement was measured to obtain greater balance between ‘treated’ (i.e. high
levels of disagreement) and ‘control’ (i.e. low levels of disagreement) on a variety of predictors
that may explain both a respondent’s propensity to engage in partisan motivated reasoning and
their selection into disagreeing networks (e.g. cognitive style, prior partisan identity strength and
political sophistication). Notably, our substantive conclusions remain the same. While these
tactics cannot fully deal with worries concerning self-selection and endogeneity, they are the best
tools available to us here. We will return to this point in the conclusion.
Results
Disagreement and knowledge of inconvenient facts
Partisans within disagreeing discussion networks are expected to evince weaker motivations to
defend their partisan identity, which should be associated with an increase in knowledge of
partisan ‘inconvenient’ facts (Hypothesis 1). We can test this hypothesis using data from the 2000
ANES and 2008–9 ANES Panel surveys. In both cases respondents were asked to indicate
whether they believed that the federal budget deficit had grown smaller, larger or stayed the
same relative to some prior point in time.13 On the 2000 ANES this measure was asked in the
matters with the discussant into the D-A framework. Using these alternative specifications would not substantially change
the conclusions we reach.
10The mean values were: −0.93 (SD: 2.01) in 1992, −1.05 (1.63) in 2000, −1.16 (1.64) in 2006, and −0.85 (2.00) in 2008.
The median value for all four surveys was −1. The percentage of respondents with at least one disagreeing discussant in their
networks is 58% (1992), 44% (2000), 51% (2006) and 59% (2008).
11These variables are also important to account for insofar as they are likely to influence economic evaluations and
knowledge (e.g. Conover, Feldman, and Knight 1986; Duch, Palmer, and Anderson 2000; Haller and Norporth 1997;
Hetherington 1996). Also included in the models below are measures of network size and network sophistication.
12One potential concern here is that variables such as political interest/news attention, and perhaps even the cognitive style
indicators, may themselves be endogenous to network composition, in which case controlling for them would introduce
post-treatment bias to our estimates. We investigate the robustness of our estimates to this consideration in online Appendix
B. We compare results from three models: no control variables, just (reasonably) exogenous demographic variables and all
controls. The same pattern of results discussed below emerges across all three models, i.e. our results do not appear to be the
result of the inclusion of these control variables. We thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing our attention to this issue.
13While the deficit is perhaps not as clearly an ‘economic’ issue are is the unemployment or inflation rates, it is
nevertheless connected to economic performance (e.g. growing deficits in recession times due to a smaller tax base and
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post-election wave of the survey and the reference point was 1992, i.e. the beginning of President
Clinton’s administration.14 Respondents on the 2008–9 Panel, meanwhile, were asked this
question in both May and July 2009 with a reference point of January 2009, i.e. the beginning of
President Obama’s term in office. In both cases the question admits an unambiguously correct
response that is potentially inconvenient for one partisan team. In the former case, a budget
deficit in 1992 had turned into a budget surplus by 2000, a fact that out-partisans (i.e. Repub-
licans) should be less likely to report, knowing that it speaks favorably to the economic record of
President Clinton. Meanwhile, the year 2009 saw a deficit in January grow larger month by
month due to efforts to combat the financial crisis, a fact potentially inconvenient for in-
partisans (i.e. Democrats). We thus expect lower levels of knowledge among out-partisans in
2000 and in-partisans in 2009. Hypothesis 1 posits a positive effect of disagreement on answering
correctly for partisans in these two groups.
We predict deficit knowledge (1= correct, 0= incorrect) with a logit model that includes the
interaction between network disagreement and partisanship and the controls discussed earlier.
We present the full results in the online appendix and concentrate on Figure 1, which plots the
average predicted probability of a correct response by partisanship and network disagreement. As
a first point, we can note that partisanship is related to knowledge as we expected: in-partisans
were more likely to answer correctly in 2000 and less likely to answer correctly in May and July
2009. This difference was sizeable in all years, with in-partisans being, on average, approximately
22 per cent more likely to be correct in 2000 but 14 per cent and 19 per cent less likely to be
correct in May and July 2009 respectively.15 The correctness of a respondent’s perceptions of the
deficit is strongly related to their partisan loyalties.
We now turn to the role of network disagreement where we see partial evidence in favor of
Hypothesis 1. Disagreement is estimated to have a positive, but statistically insignificant, influ-
ence on an out-partisan’s likelihood of answering correctly in the year 2000. The results from the
two 2008–9 ANES Panel surveys are likewise mixed. While knowledge does not vary alongside
network disagreement for in-partisans in May 2009, a positive and statistically significant rela-
tionship between disagreement and knowledge does emerge for in-partisans two months later in
July. Notably, the substantive effect of disagreement is sizeable in both 2000 among out-partisans
and July 2009 among in-partisans, albeit more precisely measured in the latter instance. The
estimated change in the probability of a correct response per one unit change in disagreement is
approximately 3–4 per cent in both cases, which yields average predicted gains in knowledge of
approximately 20 per cent when moving from the 5th to 95th percentile in disagreement.16
Figure 1 thus offers some qualified evidence in support of the role of network disagreement in
constraining partisan motivated reasoning.
Recall that individuals participating in the July 2009 wave of the ANES 2008–9 panel may also
have completed the May 2009 survey.17 This offers us the possibility of exploring how network
increased welfare spending). In addition, previous studies have connected knowledge of the deficit both to partisan motivated
reasoning, e.g. Bartels (2008), and to discussions concerning the extent of economic-based retrospective voting (e.g. Brender
and Drazen 2008; Healy and Malhotra 2013; Hellwig and Marinova 2015). Deficit knowledge is thus a good indirect indicator
of economic knowledge, particularly given the omission of knowledge measures of these other indicators on these surveys.
14Half of the 2000 ANES sample received this question in the pre-election wave and half in the post-election wave. As
network disagreement was measured on the post-election wave, we focus only on the latter sample.
15The average marginal effects of partisanship (i.e. the difference between in-partisans and out-partisans) from a model
without the interaction with disagreement was 0.22 [95% CI: 0.13, 0.32], −0.14 [− 0.20, −0.08] and −0.19 [− 0.25, −0.13]
respectively. Partisanship remains significant in the interaction models where the coefficient indicates differences in
knowledge among those with a disagreement score of 0, which covers respondents that have an equal number of agreeing
and disagreeing discussion partners.
16In 2000: bout-partisan= 0.03 [− 0.02, 0.08]; in July 2009: bin-partisan= 0.04 [0.01, 0.06].
172,389 respondents completed the May wave, while 2,178 of these respondents also completed the July wave.
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disagreement affects learning via an exploration of July responses among respondents that were
incorrect in May. We did this by adding a dummy variable for respondent correctness in May to
the July 2009 model and then recalculating the average predicted probability of a correct
response among previously incorrect respondents; the final subgraph of Figure 1 provides the
results. Out-partisans incorrect in May have a high predicted probability of being correct in July
regardless of the level of network disagreement. More intriguingly, we find a strong positive effect
of network disagreement among previously incorrect in-partisans consistent with Hypothesis 1.
This relationship, moreover, is substantial albeit quite noisy; previously incorrect in-partisans at
the 5th percentile of disagreement have a predicted probability of a correct response in July of
0.40 [0.28, 0.52] while those at the 95th percentile are nearly twice as likely to be correct on
average (0.72 [0.58, 0.86]). In this case disagreement appears to be facilitating the learning of
partisan incongruent beliefs about the economy.
Partisanship, disagreement and economic evaluations
We provide a second, and perhaps harder, test of the argument that network disagreement will be
associated with an attenuation of partisan motivated reasoning through an exploration of eva-
luations of the national economy. We say ‘harder’ because it is possible for partisans to accept
facts about the world but nevertheless interpret them in such a way as to deny their negative
partisan implications (Bisgaard 2015; Gaines et al. 2007). Given the important role retrospective
evaluations play in vote choices, this relationship is crucial to investigate.
Respondents on all five surveys were asked to indicate whether the economy was better, about
the same or worse relative to some reference point in the past, although there was some variation
in the wording of the questions. Respondents to the 1992 CNEP survey were asked to evaluate
the state of the economy relative to two years prior. Respondents on the 2000 ANES TS, on the
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Figure 1. Network disagreement and knowledge of the federal budget deficit.
Notes: Markers provide the average predicted probability of a correct answer (w/95 % confidence intervals) by partisanship and network
disagreement (x-axis). Information regarding the slope of each line and its statistical significance is provided in each subgraph. Dotted
lines represent the 5th and 95th percentile of network disagreement. See Table A6 for the full results. In-Partisans=Democrats,
Out-Partisans=Republicans in both waves.
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‘compared to 1992’.18 Respondents to the 2002 Panel and 2006 Pilot surveys, meanwhile, were
both asked to evaluate the state of the economy relative to a year prior. Finally, respondents to
the 2008–9 ANES Panel were asked in May 2009 and July 2009 to evaluate the state of the
economy relative to January 2009, i.e. when President Obama officially became President.19 In
the analyses that follow we code these measures so that higher scores indicate a belief that the
economy was doing better than in the reference period. For some of these measures respondents
could only answer on a three-point scale (1992 CNEP, 2006 ANES Pilot), while the remainder
enabled respondents to also indicate whether the economy was much or somewhat better/worse.
All in-text analyses will use focus on a three-point Worse/Same/Better structure. Table 1 provides
descriptive statistics for each measure.
Much as with our earlier analyses we are principally concerned with the evaluations of in-
partisans in negative economic conditions and the reactions of out-partisans during good times
as these contexts are the ones wherein partisan defensive motivations are perhaps most easily
observed. We predicted each retrospective evaluation measure using an ordinal logit model using
partisanship, network disagreement, their interaction and the same bevy of control variables as
Table 1. Economic evaluations across the surveys
% Better % Same % Worse Chi2(2)=
1992 CNEP
All 9.2 26.7 64.2
In-Partisans 15.7 36.2 48.1
Out-Partisans 3.9 17.9 78.3 123.9, p< 0.01
2000 ANES TS
All 72.7 22.2 5.2
In-Partisans 80.5 14.7 4.8
Out-Partisans 67.8 27.4 4.9 16.9, p< 0.01
2002 ANES Panel
All 39.1 43.0 16.9
In-Partisans 27.6 50.7 21.7
Out-Partisans 50.5 39.3 10.2 95.0, p< 0.01
2006 ANES Pilot
All 31.7 38.2 30.1
In-Partisans 48.3 37.1 14.6
Out-Partisans 17.9 40.3 41.9 84.0, p< 0.01
ANES: May 2009
All 15.2 31.8 53.0
In-Partisans 20.9 36.2 42.9
Out-Partisans 10.4 26.9 62.7 83.5, p< 0.01
ANES: July 2009
All 12.4 31.1 56.5
In-Partisans 18.8 39.8 41.4
Out-Partisans 6.0 20.4 73.6 211.7, p< 0.01
Note: Cells provide the percentage of respondents giving each response. The final column provides the results of a chi-squared test between
in- and out-partisans. Republicans= in-partisans in 1992, 2002 and 2006 (out-partisans the other years). Democrats= in-partisans in 2000
and May/July 2009 (out-partisans the other years).
18These respondents were also asked about the state of the national economy relative to a year prior. Unfortunately, this
measure was contained in the pre-election wave of the survey, while the network measures used here appeared in the post-
election wave.
19Respondents to this survey were also asked for their retrospective economic assessments in October and November 2008
in waves that come after the measurement of social disagreement. However, the financial crisis of 2008 led to near unanimity
in perceptions of the economy, with over 90% of Republicans and Democrats indicating that the economy was worse than a
year prior. As this extreme reality constraint nearly extinguished partisan biases we will not investigate it in the text. Our
analyses of these items are provided in online appendix Table A5; here we show that in-partisans continue to provide more
optimistic accounts of the economy (mainly by saying the economy is the ‘same’ as the year prior, as virtually nobody says
‘better’). Both in- and out-partisans become slightly more likely to say that the economy is ‘worse’ than a year prior with
increasing exposure to disagreement, but the effect is insubstantial due to the extremely high base rate.
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predictors. To facilitate interpretation of these results we focus on Figure 2, which plots the
average predicted probability of a respondent saying that the economy is ‘better’ by the level of
disagreement in their network (x-axis) and their partisanship. Evidence consistent with
Hypothesis 1 would thus take the form of a positively sloped line for out-partisans in the good
economic conditions of 2000 and 2006 (e.g. Republicans and Democrats respectively) and
negatively sloped lines for in-partisans in 1992, 2002 and in May and July 2009 (i.e. Republicans
in 1992 and 2002 and Democrats in 2009).
As Table 1 shows, in-partisans adopted more positive evaluations of the national economy
than out-partisans in all years save for 2002. These differences remain statistically significant in
multivariate models. However, Figure 2 provides meager evidence that disagreement affected
these differences in the manner hypothesized to occur. We can begin here with an analysis of
disagreement during positive economic conditions, i.e. in the years 2000 and 2006 where
unemployment was low, consumer confidence high and economic growth positive. The critical
test, recall, is whether disagreement is associated with increased positivity in the evaluations of
out-partisans as revealed by a positively sloped line in Figure 2, i.e. with whether Republicans
(Democrats) are more likely to give President Clinton (Bush) his due for good economic per-
formance. The evidence is not positive on this front; in 2000, out-partisans actually become a bit
less likely to say that the economy is ‘better‘ as disagreement increases while in 2006 a flat line
emerges for out-partisans across network disagreement. Indeed, the sub-graph for 2006 shows
in-partisans become significantly more negative about the economy as disagreement increases,
indicating that disagreement for these individuals may be facilitating inaccurate evaluations.20
1 In: b= 0.002, z=1.00
Out: b= –0.01, z=–2.44
In: b= –0.06, z=–2.82
Out: b= –0.003, z=–0.21
In: b= –0.01, z=–1.13
Out: b= 0.003, z=0.65
In: b= –0.005, z=–0.65
Out: b= 0.005, z=1.38
In: b= 0.03, z=1.88
Out: b= –0.01, z=–0.41
In: b= –0.003, z=–0.17






–5 –4 –3 –2 –1 0 1 2 3 4 –4 –3 –2 –1 0 1 2 3 4 –4 –3 –2 –1 0 1 2 3













































Figure 2. Network disagreement and partisan differences in economic evaluations.
Notes: Markers provide the average predicted probability of the respondent saying the economy is ‘better’ (w/95 % confidence intervals)
by partisanship and network disagreement (x-axis). Information regarding the slope of each line and its statistical significance is
provided in each subgraph. Dotted lines represent the 5th and 95th percentile of network disagreement. Republicans= in-partisans in
1992, 2002, and 2006 (out-partisans the other years). Democrats= in-partisans in 2000 and May/July 2009 (out-partisans the other
years).
20Among in-partisans, the average marginal effect of disagreement on the probability of saying ‘better’ is b =
−0.06 [− 0.10, −0.02], while for out-partisans it was −0.003 [− 0.03, 0.02].
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There is thus little evidence that network disagreement facilitates more accurate evaluations
among out-partisans in good economic conditions.
The remainder of the surveys occurred in more negative economic contexts. In such condi-
tions out-partisans should readily say that the economy is poor, while in-partisans may be more
likely to say it is good to defend their partisan team.21 Thus, the key question is whether
disagreement breaks down this latter pattern (i.e. leads to more pessimistic evaluations of the
economy among in-partisans) as revealed by a negatively sloped line in the figure. Figure 2
provides little evidence in favor of this conclusion outside of the 1992 CNEP survey. In-partisans
on this survey do report increasingly pessimistic readings of the national economy as their
exposure to interpersonal disagreement increases. For instance, an in-partisan at the 5th per-
centile of network disagreement, i.e. low levels of disagreement, has an average predicted
probability of 0.19 [0.13, 0.25] for saying ‘better’ and 0.37 [0.29, 0.46] of saying ‘worse’.
Meanwhile, in-partisans at the 95th percentile, i.e. high disagreement, do appear much more
pessimistic, being both less likely to say ‘better’ (0.09 [0.05, 0.14]) and more likely to say worse
(0.57 [0.47, 0.68]). However, in none of the other three surveys does disagreement have a
significant negative (positive) effect on the probability that in-partisans say the economy is better
(worse).22 To the extent that partisan groups look similar in these surveys it appears to be the
result of the broader economy exerting a reality constraint on respondents. Figure 2 thus pro-
vides weak evidence that network disagreement attenuates partisan motivated reasoning when it
comes to economic evaluations.
Network disagreement and partisan identity, an interlude
There is inconsistent evidence in favor of the proposition that social disagreement undermines
partisan motivated reasoning. Why is this so? One possibility is that our supposition that
disagreement weakens partisan identities, and hence the motivation to defend them, may be
incorrect. After all, both partisan identities and political discussion networks may be char-
acterized as relatively stable due to the former’s early development and the latter being princi-
pally composed of close, and stable, relationships (Campbell et al. 1960; Klofstad, McClurg, and
Rolfe 2009).23 Perhaps this link in the causal chain is missing and that is why we fail to see
stronger effects. We test this possibility in analyses reported in online Appendix A. Of particular
interest are analyses from the 2008–9 ANES Panel wherein we have both temporal distance
between disagreement and measures of partisan identity extremity as well as multiple indicators
of extremity recorded anywhere from one to ten months later in time. This contrasts with the
limited existing work on this subject that tends only to examine a single recording of extremity.24
Notably, partisans in highly disagreeing networks in September 2008 report substantially less
extreme identities in future survey waves even while controlling for pre-September reports of
identity extremity. This pattern also emerges in analyses of the cross-sectional datasets. While
partisans in disagreeing networks possess weaker partisan identities and thus putatively possess
weaker motivations to defend those identities, they nevertheless do not evince a reduced
21In-partisans in 1992 and 2002 would be Republican respondents, while in-partisans for the two 2009 waves would be
Democrats.
22To be clear, the average estimated effect of disagreement on the probability of the respondent saying ‘better’ is negative,
but it is small and noisy: −0.003 [− 0.04, 0.03] in 2002, −0.01 [− 0.03, 0.01] in May 2009, and −0.004 [− 0.02, 0.01] in
July 2009.
23We thank an anonymous reviewer for making this point salient.
24Klofstad, Sokhey, and McClurg (2013), for instance, only examine a single report of identity strength whereas we focus
on four such reports. In addition, we also include analyses of partisan identity ambivalence, which contributes to prior work
that has focused primarily on extremity (either directly so or via measures of identity change, e.g. Sinclair 2012). We find that
disagreement is associated with increased ambivalence which is consistent with cross-sectional evidence (e.g. Lavine,
Johnston, and Steenbergen 2012) as well as with studies of disagreement and ambivalence in issue attitudes or candidate
preferences (e.g. Visser and Mirabile 2004).
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likelihood of consistently adopting identity-incongruent economic evaluations. We discuss some
reasons why in our concluding discussion.
Conclusion
We have investigated whether interpersonal disagreement mitigates partisan differences in
economic perceptions by undermining the individual’s underlying motivation to defend their
partisan team against negative information. Using the best available observational data we have
shown limited evidence in favor of this possibility. On the one hand, we found some evidence
that exposure to disagreement may facilitate the learning of inconvenient political facts, but some
of this evidence was statistically imprecise (i.e. the 2000 ANES analyses) and the effect failed to
manifest in another survey (May 2009 analyses). On the other hand, we found scant evidence
that the level of disagreement in a partisan’s network was associated with an attenuation of
partisan biases in evaluations of the national economy outside of the 1992 CNEP survey. At the
very least, we feel that our analyses suggest that network disagreement is no easy panacea for
concerns over partisan motivated reasoning. In the remainder of this article we will discuss some
of the implications of our study for future research.
We begin by discussing the potential role of self-selection in this study. As noted earlier, we
utilize observational data, which raises the specter that partisans will select into disagreeing or
agreeing networks based on background characteristics. It is thus worth considering the
potential role these selection pressures may have on the results found in this study. When it
comes to our analyses of economic evaluations and factual knowledge, the concern with self-
selection is that individuals prone to avoiding directional motivated reasoning will self-select
into disagreeable contexts and thus evidence of a reduction in partisan motivated reasoning is
spurious. Much as above we cannot fully evade such concerns with observational evidence.
However, by controlling for need for cognition and need to evaluate we believe we are capturing
some of this process. Moreover, we actually found scant evidence that partisans within dis-
agreeable networks showed lesser evidence of partisan motivated reasoning. Given that selection
processes, to the extent that they are present, are likely pushing in the opposite direction, we feel
that this further speaks to the validity of our results. However, future work could build on these
findings, and those related to partisan identity strength, by leveraging natural experiments that
introduce exogenous variation into networks, as in Klofstad’s (2010) study of dorm assignments.
In the end, we believe that our results offer the most comprehensive available portrait of the
relationship between social disagreement and partisan motivated reasoning, self-selection warts
and all.
Perhaps the most important question to emerge from this study concerns how we should
interpret the rather mixed evidence that emerges in our analyses. We see at least two possibilities
here. First, the mixed evidence here may suggest that network disagreement plays little consistent
role in undermining partisan defensive motivations, at least in this domain. While interpersonal
disagreement may undermine a partisan’s identity strength, and hence their motivation to
counter-argue inconsistent information, it may nevertheless be the case that these partisans still
have sufficient motivation and resources to rebut party-incongruent information. Moreover, the
very act of discussion may prompt individuals to more deeply consider information and, via this
enhanced elaboration, formulate issue-specific attitudes more resistant to change even in the
midst of weakened partisan identities (Levendusky, Druckman, and McLain 2016). If this is the
case, then scholars interested in understanding the nature of partisan motivated reasoning, and
particularly its limits, may be better off exploring broader contextual features of the environment
such as elite polarization, the nature of a nation’s political institutions and their resulting
influence on partisan identities, or the nature of news discourse, than focusing on interpersonal
relationships (e.g. Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus 2013; Lupu 2015; Robison and Mullinix
2016).
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An alternative interpretation of the results reported here is that the influence of disagreement
may in fact be conditional in nature. For instance, it may be no accident that we observed
stronger results on measures of factual knowledge than on retrospective evaluations as partisans
may come to accept identity-incongruent facts but simply respond by rationalizing them on
measures that invite more subjectivity (Bisgaard 2015; Gaines et al. 2007). Disagreement may
thus attenuate partisan motivated reasoning, but do so only in specific domains. Alternatively,
perhaps the network batteries explored here do not capture the types of social interactions that
matter. The name generator batteries used on the surveys tend to capture close ties, although a
fair proportion of reported discussants nevertheless stem from ‘weak’ tie relations (Klofstad,
McClurg, and Rolfe 2009). Notably, Mutz and Mondak (2006) show that discussions with weak
ties found in the workplace were more effective in fostering political tolerance than was dis-
cussion with relatives, i.e. stronger ties. This fits with Klar’s (2014) study which focused on
discussion between individuals that did not know each other and thus had little expectation of
future interactions. Perhaps, then, we should look to discussions fostered outside of one’s peer
networks, for instance on the internet, as a source of attenuation for partisan biases (Wojcieszak
and Mutz 2009). However, on this last point we can note that incorporating indicators of
discussion frequency and tie strength into our measure of network disagreement did not change
our conclusions (see online Appendix D). Regardless, one area for future work would be to
theorize about potential conditionality for the influence of network disagreement and test it with
appropriate data; to the extent that these conditional factors fail, then the first interpretation
would gain influence over the latter. Whichever explanation ultimately finds support will have
deep political, normative and empirical implications for how we understand the nature and
quality of public opinion.
Supplementary material. Data replication sets can be found in Harvard Dataverse at: https://dx.doi.org/doi:10.7910/DVN/
CHBAYB and online appendices at: doi: 10.1017/S0007123418000315
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